

Mid-term evaluation of the United Entrepreneurship Coalition's MFS II programme

Final report

Client: Spark

Rotterdam, 28 June 2013



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1 Introduction

1.1 Objectives of the evaluation

In March 2012, SPARK awarded Ecorys with a specific contract for carrying out the mid-term evaluation of the United Entrepreneurship Coalition's (UEC) MFS II programme. The objectives of the evaluation are to assess extent to which outputs and outcomes have been achieved and to provide the UEC with lessons learnt and recommendations for programme continuation. However the main aim for UEC is learning for the improvement of the programme design, so as to enhance its relevance and effectiveness. The official timespan of the evaluation is January 2011 to December 2012, but results achieved after this date have also been included where possible. The evaluation covers all five countries where UEC is working.

1.2 Evaluation questions

The overall aim of the evaluation is to gain insight into the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the programme. The ToR specifies (see Annex I) which specific issues should be addressed in relation to these criteria.

Judgment criteria/ indicators were defined for each evaluation question. A detailed description of the evaluation framework can be found in Annex B

1.3 Methodology and organisation

The mid-term evaluation was conducted over a relatively short time-span of less than three months. Conclusions were based on the results of the desk review, field visits, a survey for programme partners and interviews with main stakeholders in the Netherlands and selected countries. The assignment took place in three phases in which activities were undertaken simultaneously.

To answer the evaluation questions we have used a combination of data collection methods. The desk review and survey were combined with more in-depth projects evaluations in the field. Knowledge obtained was augmented with information received through the (telephone) interviews with key staff of the different partners involved in the UEC programme (a full list of persons interviewed can be found in Annex A). The selected methods were complementary and combined use served to triangulate the findings.

The evaluation consisted of three phases: 1) inception phase, 2) implementation phase and 3) analysis and reporting phase.

Phase I – Inception

The following activities were undertaken by the evaluation during the inception phase.

- Kick-off meeting March 20, 2013.
- Communication with the two country experts.
- An initial desk review of the main programme documents.
- Preparation of concise questionnaires and topic lists for the country experts.
- A reconstruction of the intervention logic.
- An elaboration of the evaluation framework that was presented in the proposal.

- Official briefing on April 4, 2013 at the SPARK office in Amsterdam.
- Preparation of the inception note.

Selection of country visits and programme partners

Rwanda and the Occupied Palestinian territories (OPT) were selected as the two target countries for this evaluation. The two countries were selected because of the expected learning opportunities, in particular the explanatory factors for the monitoring data results on outputs and outcomes.

To efficiently use the time available to the local consultants, the core evaluation team guided and instructed both experts as much and strict as possible, which in the case of Rwanda was followed up during the country visit of Anja Willemsen. This concerned the provision of questionnaires, research topics, reporting formats and lists of interviewees. It also included a selection of local partners for in-depth study. The suggested partners selection was based on the criteria 'involvement in the programme', 'type and relevancy of activities' and logistical possibilities. In addition, the preference expressed by SPARK and BiD Network was taken into consideration. Three to four partners per country were selected to be studied in-depth.

OPT

In the UEC Activity Plan 2013, it was indicated that "the UEC will continue to work with the existing four partners – Birzeit University Center of Excellence (Birzeit CoE), Birzeit University Center for Continuing Education (Birzeit CCE), Business Women Forum Palestine (BWF) and the Business and Technology Incubator of the Islamic University of Gaza (BTI/IUG)".

All partners have been active in proposing and implementing projects. CoE have proposed a mix of dealing with youth unemployment and entrepreneurship, combined with expertise in ICT. CCE have submitted a proposal related to capacity building and innocation of young professionals. BWF intend to train women and guide the submission of business plans.

CoE, CCE and BWF are all located in Ramallah, BTI/IUG in Gaza. During the briefing with SPARK it was indicated that partners in both locations might provide good learning opportunities. The results of the partners in Ramallah are falling behind while the results of BTI/IUG seem to be very good, and a further analysis of this would be of interest to UEC. It was therefore decided to select all partners in OPT for further analysis in the field studies. In addition, the local local expert was requested to interview FPCCIA, a partner whose involvement in the UEC programme is suspended.

Rwanda

In Rwanda, a larger number of local partners are active. The UEC Activity Plan mentions that "the present UEC programme partners, Junior Chamber International (JCI) Rwanda, the National University of Rwanda (NUR), Umutara Polytechnic (Umutara) and the Private Sector Federation (PSF) will continue with their current projects in 2013. In addition, UEC will start with support of the Rwanda Tourism University College (RTUC), the School of Finance & Banking (SFB)¹, the Parlement des Jeunes Rwandais (PAJER) and the It may say this but KIST is not being supported, intead INES is.

Three of the partners were selected for the country visits, whilst a focus group was held with the new partners. JCI and PSF were logical partners considering their respective partnership with BiD Nnetwork and role in SME development in Rwanda. Umutara Politechnic was added to include a partner from outside Kigali and because of their good results.

¹ Although this one was subsequently not approved.

Phase II – Implementation

In the period after the inception phase, the following activities were undertaken by the project team.

- A desk review took place of the documents that were made available by SPARK and BiD network, with the aim to obtain a general idea about the progress of the programme in achieving the outputs and outcomes and any relevant issues that occur.
- Field visits took place in Rwanda and Palestine. In Rwanda, the local expert was joined by Anja Willemsen of Ecorys. The expert in Palestine managed to visit both West Bank and Gaza, which is very positive as this allows him to compare these two regions within the country.
- Interviews were conducted in person with SPARK, BiD network and by telephone with cooperation partners as well as validation interviews with local partners.
- A survey for local partners was drafted and sent to 12 local partners in Burundi, Liberia and Kosovo on 7 May, to which a response was given by nine partners. In addition to this survey, validation interviews were held with local partners.

Phase III - Analysis

In the final phase of the project, the findings of the previous activities are analysed and reported in the evaluation report. The findings will be presented in a debriefing with UEC programme management.

1.4 Challenges

In conducting the present evaluation, the team has been confronted with a number of challenges. Due to the short time span within which the review was planned, only two months after the official briefing, the desk review and country visits partially overlapped. This required the drafting of a clear instruction note and sharing of new issues identified. Ideally, the desk review would have been finalised in order to best feed the local experts with information and research questions.

The main challenge was the minimal involvement of the international consultant in the country visits. It was positive that SPARK decided to allow for an additional country visit by Ms Willemsen, but the role of the local consultants was still such, that the team relied to a large extent on their inputs. In OPT, the team relied completely on the local experts. This has proven to be a challenge, in particular considering the short timeframe, limiting the possibilities to retrieve more information from the local consultants.

2 Overview of the programme

2.1 Main characteristics of the UEC Programme

International development organisations SPARK and BiD Network received a EUR 21 million grant from the Dutch government in 2011 to implement the United Entrepreneurship Coalition (UEC) programme under the second Dutch Co-Financing Scheme (MFS II).

The Alliance aims to alleviate poverty by creating employment opportunities through empowering entrepreneurs, through Southern partners, in fragile states, and least developed countries (LDCs), namely: Kosovo, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Rwanda, Liberia and Burundi. Therefore UEC has adopted “a full chain approach as key to entrepreneurship development supporting relevant (vocational) educational institutions, CSOs and governmental agencies to each optimally perform their respective role in the creation of an enabling environment for private sector development”²².

UECs full chain approach is expressed in the selection of local partner organisations that participate in the implementation of the programme. The table below presents an overview of the Alliance and its cooperation partners and local partner organisations.

Type/ Country	Organisation
Consortium Partners	SPARK
	BiD Network
Cooperation Partners	MDF
	Triodos Facet
	Maastricht School of Management
	Intent
	Netherlands African Business Council
	Infodev (US)
Local partner organisations	
Burundi	Burundi Business Incubator (BBIN)
	Council for Education and Local Economic Development (COPED)
	Association des Femmes Entrepreneurs du Burundi (AFAB)
	REJA
	CUFORE
Kosovo	Business Support Centre Kosovo (BSCK)
	Business Advisory Centre Zvecan
	Fractal (suspended)
	Kosovo Association of Information and Communication Technology (STIKK)
	CTD
	BSC Strpce
Liberia	Business Support Centre (BSC) Monrovia
	Liberia Better Business Forum (LBBF)
	Association of Liberian Universities (ALU)
Palestine	Centre of Excellence (CoE) of Bir Zeit University (West Bank)

²²Spark, Management Summary MFSII Proposal

Type/ Country	Organisation
	Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce Industry and Agriculture (FPCCIA) (suspended)
	Centre for Continuing Education (CCE) of the Bir Zeit University
	Business Women Forum (West Bank) in Palestine
	BTI Gaza
Rwanda	Junior Chamber International Rwanda (JCIR)
	Private Sector Federation (PSF)
	National University of Rwanda (NUR)
	Umutara Polytechnic (UP)
	<i>Rwanda Tourism University College (RTUC)</i>
	<i>INES</i>
	<i>Parlement des Jeunes Rwandais (PAJER)</i>

2.2 Intervention logic

In the inception phase we made a reconstruction of the intervention logic of the UEC programme as we felt that formulating an explicit intervention logic would be useful for our evaluation to ensure a common understanding of what UEC means to achieve and how this is to be done. The intervention logic is a means to understand how the various elements of the programme fit together in terms of inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts (and the assumptions made about cause and effect, and risks).

Assumptions


The underlying assumptions together form the theory of change of the programme. From a general perspective the intervention logic is reasonable and proven, focusing on partner organisations and marginalised groups by developing skills and facilitating start and growth, of SMEs eventually leading to SMEs started and grown and job creation. The link between the activities, outputs and outcomes related to an enabling environment for private sector development is however less direct, taking into account other influencing factors such as government policy, donor pressure, other donor programmes etc.

The assumption behind the intervention logic related to the achievement of the expected impacts of the programme are:

- SME sector development contributes to the development of a strong middle class. In fragile states, a strong middle class develops a healthy civil society to function as a countervailing power to the state and will lead to increasing pressure on the state to reduce barriers to doing business.
- Non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies is of special importance to reinforce the stabilisation of such states.
- Civil society organisations can provide important support to governments in fragile states, to fill a gap the weak government leaves in entrepreneurship and SME development.
- SME development contributes to new jobs, raises incomes and contributes to sustained poverty reduction, provided that such growth is pro-poor.
- Training and strengthening local partners in advocacy will lead to increased participation of civil society in policy development. It will better equip them to support entrepreneurs and SMEs and reach marginalised groups and remote regions.

- Unemployment is a key link between the lack of economic growth and the amount of poverty in fragile states. The start and growth of SMEs will create new jobs (especially in remote regions and amongst marginalised groups).
- A more enabling environment for SME and entrepreneurship will lead to faster economic growth and thereby contribute to poverty alleviation.
- Lower unemployment and reduced poverty will lead to increased stability in fragile states.

Of course it is self evident that to achieve the training and other activities must be of good quality with due attention for process and interaction.



The needs underlying the intervention by UEC can be summarised as follows:

- CSOs in fragile states are limited in reaching remote areas and marginalised groups for several reasons including 1) their capacity to provide services to entrepreneurs and SMEs is insufficient. 2) the lack of the rule of law places CSOs at risk to corruption or extortion, 3) Poor infrastructure and 3) a lack of focus on marginalised groups
- SME activity in the target countries is limited, and entrepreneurs in fragile states receive little government support. Marginalised groups (e.g. ethnical groups, rural population, women, young people) are underrepresented as employees in existing SMEs.
- Entrepreneurs in fragile states experience serious barriers to doing business. Governments insufficiently engage CSOs and entrepreneurs in policy development. Cooperation between civil society actors is weak, which disables the ability to play a unified advocacy role vis-a-vis the government on the removal of barriers to doing business and on inclusion of marginalised communities and regions.

This leads to three UEC objectives, which are also the three main UEC strategy lines:

1. To build capacity of the local partners (and through them organisations in their networks) to support entrepreneurship and SME development, especially in remote regions and amongst marginalised groups;
2. To extend support to starting entrepreneurs as well as existing SMEs with a high pro-poor growth potential;
3. To remove barriers to doing business for the entrepreneurs and SMEs, leading to a (more) enabling environment for private sector development;

To achieve these objectives, a number of activities need to be undertaken by SPARK, BiD network, their cooperation partners and local partners, leading to outputs and outcomes that are expected to contribute to realising the objectives. These are presented in the table in Annex A. Activities undertaken by the project partners should be in direct support of achieving the defined outputs and outcomes, and in particular those aimed at supporting vulnerable groups in the five target countries.

3 Findings relevance

The relevance of the UEC programme concerns the extent to which activities employed under the programme respond to the priorities and needs in the target countries, and contribute to achieving the objectives of the UEC programme. The relevance is assessed along the following evaluation questions:

- What is the relevance of the programme and its activities in view of the programme partners' and countries' priorities and needs?
- What is the relevance of the activities in view of the beneficiaries needs, including conflict-sensitivity?
- What is the relevance of the approach of the Alliance partners and Cooperation partners ?
- What is the relevance of the programme partners selected?

3.1 Relevance in view of beneficiary and programme partners' priorities and needs

All partner proposal forms (PPF) reviewed present activities related to entrepreneurship development and in all countries vulnerable groups such as young and women entrepreneurs are targeted. It proved difficult to identify how the specific vulnerable groups (e.g. ethnic minorities, socially weak groups) are reached by the proposed activities, as this is mostly not specified in the proposals, and can be politically sensitive too. The review shows that a substantial number of the projects is spread geographically in the countries which is an important indicator reflecting that activities are relevant for reaching marginalised communities. The proposal features a section establishing the project context and the needs and gaps that it tries to address.

The table below presents how the PPFs present activities related to the target groups women and young entrepreneurs, and activities related to entrepreneurship and capacity building aimed directly at the partner organisations.

Table 3.1 Coverage of UEC principles as per partner proposal forms

Country	Organisations	Women	Young Entrepreneurs	Entrepreneurship	Capacity Building	Geographic spread
Burundi	AFAB	✓		✓	✓	✓
	COPED		✓	✓		✓
	Cufore		✓	✓	✓	
	REJA		✓	✓		✓
Kosovo	BC Zvecan		✓	✓	✓	✓
	BSC Strpce	✓	✓	✓		
	BCK		✓	✓	✓	
	CTD		✓	✓		
	Fractal	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	STIKK	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Liberia	ALU		✓	✓	✓	
	BSC Monrovia		✓	✓	✓	✓
	LBBF			✓		
OPT	BTI IUG	✓	✓	✓	✓	

Country	Organisations	Women	Young Entrepreneurs	Entrepreneurship	Capacity Building	Geographic spread
	BWF	✓		✓	✓	✓
	CCE		✓	✓	✓	
	CoE		✓	✓	✓	✓
Rwanda	JCI		✓	✓	✓	
	NUR		✓	✓	✓	✓
	PAJER		✓	✓		✓
	PSF			✓	✓	
	UP		✓	✓		✓

However, in practice not all partners manage to implement activities relevant to their target group. For instance, West Bank partner BWF mostly aims its activities at existing SMEs instead of new start-ups, young people and women entrepreneurs. This approach is taken by BWF for practical reasons, as this is what they have always been doing so far, and where they feel most comfortable. A vision to target and develop other groups, those in accordance with the UEC programme, seems to be lacking.

In Rwanda not all partners, in particular those based in Kigali have a specific focus on the more vulnerable groups in society. Moreover youth is often a wider criteria than the global definition of youth (18 to 35 years) in African countries. In the first two years of the programme the rural areas in Rwanda were only serviced via UP. The recent start of support for four new programme partners and in particular PAJER is expected to increase the outreach to marginalised groups.

Findings from the field visits in OPT and Rwanda show that the programme and projects visited address real needs in the field and fill in evident gaps in the enabling environment for private sector development.

This is confirmed by local partners from the other countries, who indicate that the UEC responds well to the need for business skills, by funding business incubators that provide entrepreneurship trainings and coaching services to the entrepreneurs themselves. They also consider the programme to be well able to take into account the vulnerability of target groups and that it helps increasing employment, the growth of start-ups and the development on SMEs.

Reasons for gaps identified are the limited SME development support for the specific target groups (e.g. unschooled, youth, rural population) and limited economic status of many of the beneficiaries. Although the governments in both Rwanda and OPT have private sector development on the list of national development priorities the limited availability of resources (as well as decisions about their distribution) conspires to limited support for the more vulnerable communities. UEC-supported projects target these gaps with a specific focus on youth, women and other marginalised groups.

In addition access to finance is found to be problematic in the programme countries. UEC has identified access to finance as an important issue. Training on access to finance is provided and beneficiaries have access to the match making facility (Bid Network) and in three of the countries SPARK's' Loan Guarantee Fund issues loans to winners of the business plan competitions. In Rwanda projects in rural areas in additions provide seed money to starting businesses.

Match with priorities and needs of the programme partners

The survey and country visit findings show a good match between the UEC programme and its activities and the priorities and needs of most of the programme partners. Two Burundian POs commented:

- The main reasons for our organisation to apply for funding of UEC (SPARK) is that we have the same objectives such as the promotion of the entrepreneurship by building capacity of the entrepreneurs, reducing poverty by creating jobs and advocacy for doing strategic plan 2008 – 2012
- Before commencement of the programme, our organisation constantly found it hard to implement its mission statement, since our main products and services were not only new in the Burundian market but also because we lacked strong experience in implementing projects that boost capacity building in entrepreneurship.

The good match between the strategic focus of the UEC programme and programme partner objectives reflects positively on the selection (and monitoring) processes. Different approaches have been followed to select programme partners in the different programme countries. In some of the countries like Burundi calls for proposals have been held whilst in others such as Rwanda programme partners have been approached and selected as potential programme partners by consultants. In Rwanda it is felt that this approach may have led to some less optimal matches because POs did not need to apply for funding themselves. In this respect one of the programme partners interviewed mentioned their proposal very much followed the objectives of the UEC (SPARK) programme which on hindsight did not reflect the priorities and needs of the organisation.

3.2 Relevance of the approach of the Northern partners.

SPARK and Bid Network

The complementarity and cooperation possibilities of SPARK and BiD Network presented in the MFS proposal were very strong and clear on paper: both support entrepreneurs and SMEs in their own, complementary way. This complementary and close cooperation has indeed materialised in the implementation of the programme, but both partners showed some reservation as to the successfulness of their collaboration. Their 'styles' differ such, that acting as one managing, steering and stimulating body to the partners has not been possible and they have started to go their own ways. BiD Network focuses on using their own products and organising business events, but seems less concerned with the overall management of the programme. SPARK on the other hand took a strong role in process management of the programme. The partners have struggled to find the right way of cooperation and balancing their interests, but both indicate the situation is now satisfactory, and that they recognise the added value of each other. Nevertheless during a PAC meeting, programme partners expressed that there is a lack of communication between BiD Network and SPARK, and that they should be sending messages to the local partners "as one voice". It is however difficult to assess the effects of this changed cooperation and the extent to which it prevents synergy within the programme. As mentioned above, in the first two years of the UEC programme SPARK staff very much concentrated on programme management which left limited time for support to partners. In Rwanda critical comments were made in this respect, partners indicated that they would have valued a more (content wise support) and partner role of SPARK.

Bid Network uses online business plan competitions as a framework to provide its support services and matchmaking facility. In Rwanda, after a first offline competition, all follow up competitions were held online. In most of the programme countries, the threshold for online activities appears to be

still high and less relevant for the vulnerable target groups. BiD Network have indicated that the countries included in the UEC programme do not match the standard profile of countries where BiD is active, as these commonly have a more developed business environment.

Cooperation Partners

The active cooperation partners MDF, Triodos, MsM, IntEnt and NABC all have a training profile, except for NABC with a focus on different type of beneficiaries. MsM focuses on curriculum development and therefore works with universities, IntEnt works with diaspora entrepreneurs in particular, and other have a general SME support and capacity building profile (MDF, Triodos), with the distinction that MDF activities for the programme will need to concentrate on more soft skills support, including coaching and Triodos on more technical training. Despite this division, in practice an overlap of training provision has been observed by local partners as well as the cooperation partners themselves.

SPARK has recognised this problem and has amended the contract with IntEnt to change their focus from local partners to partners in diaspora only. Another example is provided by MsM. They consider their contribution to be mainly in the area of business development services but in reality (and according to their contract), their involvement is limited to development of a Bachelor/Master curriculum on entrepreneurship, as the other services would resemble too much activities undertaken by other cooperation partners. In addition activities in Liberia had to be halted because they overlapped with activities of other donors³. This made MsM almost redundant. They are currently discussing with SPARK what their role in Liberia can still be. In OPT, MsM has developed the entrepreneurship curriculum for Birzeit University ten years ago, and are therefore not eager to start doing this again.

Interviews with programme partners showed that a number of them find it hard to distinguish between the activities of the different Northern partners. Cooperation partners similarly reported, that in some cases it was not clear to local partners why they were approached by a cooperation partner, and what the added value of the training was compared to the previous training by another partner. Sometimes this was only a matter of miscommunication, and the partner could be convinced about the purpose and relevance of the training. The training provision therefore seems less demand driven and more supply driven.

Relevance of support activities

The programme puts a large emphasis on training and capacity building activities. The local partners in general feel that the programme sufficiently meets their needs related to capacity building. Partners and beneficiaries in Gaza and West Bank reported that the capacity building activities for their staff and beneficiaries were provided by professional experts, in a demand driven manner and tailored way. This is confirmed by survey results. Also BiD network's activities related to networking and matching SMEs with investors were considered an added value to the project. On the contrary, other programme partners in OPT and Rwanda reported that the contributions of international trainers sometimes seemed more relevant for Dutch entrepreneurs than for the specific target perceived 'overkill' in provision of training support.

Cooperation partners are less positive about the relevance of the training activities for the programme partners. They acknowledge the need for private sector development, in particular for the identified vulnerable groups. Some of them however are critical about the ability of the programme partners to identify their needs. One cooperation partner indicated that many of the partner organisations lack a long term vision, which makes it difficult to identify what they need despite the training needs assessment made. Proposed activities are to a large extent linked to the

³ ,The University of Tilburg has signed an MoU with the local university to develop a curriculum in the area of entrepreneurship

regular activities the partner and are not used to initiate new ideas and opportunities to reach their target groups notwithstanding efforts made to steer these partners.

The programme proposal states that the UEC intends to pursue advocacy activities via its programme partners. The experience of the alliance partners in this respect is not considered sufficiently. Organisations are positive about the support provided for roundtables and paper writing which helps to disseminate and explain the issues at stake. Nevertheless in the keystone Development Partnerships Survey 2013 SPARK scored relatively low on advocacy & campaigning. Looking ahead respondents indicated that they would like to share advocacy.

3.3 Relevance of the programme partners selected

The UEC is pursuing a full chain approach in which it intends to support relevant (vocational) educational institutions, CSOs and governmental agencies to each perform their respective role in creation of an enabling environment. Thus following this approach ideally, a mix of universities and business support organisations is selected per country, covering young entrepreneurs and development of entrepreneurship curriculum on the one hand, and practical support to entrepreneurs and young or starting businesses on the other hand. In the selection of organisations, this balance between the two types of organisations is maintained in most countries except in Kosovo, where only business support organisations have been selected, albeit in different geographic locations of the country.

In OPT, the following mix of partners is active:

- **Islamic University of Gaza (IUG)** – targeting, via the Business Incubator in the IT department, graduated unemployed youth (age 19-31) who have business ideas and potential for entrepreneurial activities.
- **Birzeit University Center of Excellence (BZU CoE)** – is an independent unit at BZU that aims to attract innovative university students with business ideas. CoE contributes by strengthening their capacities to develop their own business plans, to be utilised as a pipeline for business incubators in Ramallah.
- **Center of Continuing Education (CCE)** – targets Palestinian youth as well as adults to develop their capacities in different fields, with a focus on private sector development and public sector reform. Within the UEC programme, CCE targets marginalised youth in Jerusalem and the rural areas and existing firms in the West Bank by building their capacities to start up and build entrepreneurship businesses.
- **Business Women Forum (BWF)** – is a NGO for women, managed by active business women in the West Bank. It aims empowering young women to become more economically independent and self-sustainable.

This provides to be a good mix of partners, covering not only the different targets groups and thematic aspects of the programme, but also the different regions in the country (Gaza and West Bank principally). In Gaza, the IUG is in charge of the whole 'process' from A to Z while in the West Bank, the business incubators were separate existing firms that the partners have no control on them, though had agreements to feed them with the professional pipeline of youth who have SME's potential.

In Rwanda, the UEC programme recently included three new partners and is now working through seven (six when JCI is excluded) local partners to support the respective beneficiaries. Some of the partners are based in the capital city, Kigali whereas others are upcountry – outside the capital city.

In regard to the nature of partners, the majority (four out of seven) are educational institutions. Universities seem a logical partner especially in the area of entrepreneurship capacity building, where many believe that training students is most appropriate in terms of preparing students to become future business leaders. On the other hand it is mentioned, also in the Rwandan context that the relevance of the programmes to universities is not always clear. Universities are more active in entrepreneurship as a general concept, than in actual business development services. Other partners are associations in nature that are grouping together a membership based constituency and one CSO.

The mix of partners in Rwanda however does not include a strong business incubator. This became apparent after the success of the first business plan competition. Both implementing programme partners were not able to support the many successful participants of the competitions. Some of the beneficiaries mentioned in this respect that they would have liked more follow up support from the programme.

4 Findings effectiveness

4.1 Introduction

The effectiveness of the UEC programme is assessed by the extent to which the programme has attained its outputs and outcomes in accordance with the monitoring protocol, and whether the activities undertaken and outputs achieved by the programme partners have been likely to be effective towards the programme's outcomes and objectives.

4.2 Concrete outputs and outcomes

The monitoring protocol result table for 2011 shows that most output targets for 2011 were attained, and that even some of the outcomes planned for 2012 were already realised in 2011. Table 4.1 below presents an aggregated overview of the attained outputs and outcomes in 2011 and 2012. The overview contains data collected by SPARK from local partners and from BiD Network. Marked red are those results that lag behind.

Table 4.1 Monitoring protocol results 2011 and 2012

Output/outcome	2011			2012			Total		
	Target	Result	Attained	Target	Result	Attained	Target	Result	Attained
Outputs									
1. # of (potential) entrepreneurs trained / awarded certificate	1.000	1.512	151%	3.000	3.141	105%	4.000	4.653	116%
2. # of (potential) entrepreneurs from vulnerable groups trained / awarded certificate	760	1.297	171%	2.280	2.028	89%	3.040	3.325	109%
3. % of (potential) entrepreneurs from vulnerable groups trained / awarded certificate	76%	86%	113%	76%	65%	85%	76%	75%	99%
4. # of approved business plan applications	300	2.317	772%	1.000	1.007	101%	1.300	3.324	256%
5. # of approved business plan applications from vulnerable groups	228	1.344	589%	760	739	97%	988	2.083	211%
6. % of approved business plan applications from vulnerable groups	76%	58%	76%	76%	73%	97%	76%	66%	86%
7. # of attendees of network sessions	1.000	2.954	295%	1.000	7.171	717%	2.000x	10.125	506%
8. # of attendees of network sessions from vulnerable groups	760	2.245	295%	760	2.537	334%	1.520	4.782	315%
9. # of successful matchmaking introductions	-	33		115	162	141%	115	195	170%
10. # of successful matchmaking introductions for vulnerable groups	-	-		87	157	180%	87	157	180%
11. # of website hits	25.000	8.551	34%	50.000	20.785	42%	75.000	29.336	39%
12. # of roundtable sessions and multi-stakeholder dialogues held	1	6	600%	1	108	10800%	2	114	5700%
13. # of advocacy strategies (re)formulated	-	14		-	10		-	24	
Outcomes									
14. # of indirect jobs created	-	33		-	1.366		-	1.399	
15. # of jobs created in started SMEs	-	165		155	769	496%	155	934	603%
16. # of jobs created in started SMEs taken by vulnerable groups	-	-		124	254	205%	124	254	205%
17. # of SMEs started	-	46		20	127	635%	20	173	865%
18. # of SMEs started by vulnerable groups	-	18		15	85	559%	15	103	680%
19. % of SMEs started by vulnerable groups	76%	40%	53%	76%	67%	88%	76%	53%	70%
20. # of SMEs grown	-	24		20	121	605%	20	145	725%
21. # of SMEs grown among vulnerable groups	-	-		15	107	704%	15	107	704%
22. % of new SMEs that survive first 3 years	0%	0%		0%	0%		0%	0%	
23. % decrease in business barrier index	0%	0%		250%	0%	0%	250%	0%	0%
24. Level of engagement of policy makers	-	-		-	-		-	-	

The table clearly shows that in 2011 a very good start was made, with high results for all outputs except “number of website hits”. Several outcomes were reported already, even though outcomes were only planned to be realised from 2012 on. The highest output scores were achieved for “approved business plan applications”, and “roundtable sessions/stakeholder dialogues held”. At the same time, the table indicates that insufficient approved business plans were submitted from vulnerable groups, the main target group of UEC. BiD network in their Narrative Report 2012-H1 write that the number of quality business plans that have the potential to become financed remains limited.

In 2012, similar positive results were reported on the outcomes, but five outputs were lagging behind. Two of these were only three percent below target, and two others between 15 en 11 percent below target. In 2012 the lowest output score was again on “website hits”. This concerns the number of unique page views to the websites of BiD Network. In this respect BiD acknowledge in their annual report 2012 that “online support of entrepreneurs in the 5 UEC countries has proven to be more challenging than expected”. Reasons provided are the limited access to internet, IT literacy, language barriers, fear for copycats and a lack of need to use an online platform due to the small size of the market. However, they also see a gradual increase of online activity on the BiD platform, indicating that improvement is made in this area. In addition, BiD developed offline forms for those countries with low internet penetration.

In 2012, a high output score was again reached for “roundtable sessions/stakeholder dialogues”, and almost all outcomes scored hundreds of percentages above target. A low outcome score was realised for the percentage of SMEs started by vulnerable groups, which confirms the trend observed in 2011 that the target group does not seem to be reached sufficiently. At the same time, the outcome “number of SMEs grown among vulnerable groups” scored very high. It is therefore difficult to draw conclusions from only the quantitative figures. Some of the high scores on outcomes might be explained by unrealistically low targets that were set by UEC. For instance, the total number of SMEs grown among vulnerable groups in all five countries in two year was targeted to be 15. In practice, 107 such SMEs have grown, which blow up the result considerably.

Country performance

Based on the results per country in 2012 (data is not available for 2011), it can be concluded that Kosovo, OPT and Rwanda are the best scoring countries. In these countries no outcome areas are lagging behind although some output results are lower than expected. Burundi and Liberia are the least performing countries. Worth noticing is that the targets in the partner proposal forms are mostly not in conformance with the targets set by UEC. In most cases, the targets are lower, but sometimes they are higher. The table in Annex C shows the performance per partner in 2012.

Partner performance in OPT and Rwanda

An analysis at partner level has been made for OPT and Rwanda in 2012. In both countries the targets per partner vary considerably. This can be explained by the different nature of the partners, although it seems remarkable that, for example, for some partners “number of approved business plan” is a target, but “number of approved business plan from vulnerable groups” is not, whereas this output is at the core of the UEC programme. For one of the programme partners in OPT, only one target is set, which seems unlikely. The credibility of the monitoring table is therefore not clear when it comes to the targets. However, there is no reason to assume this applies also to the reported *results*.

In OPT, BTI Gaza were given four output and three outcome targets for 2012. These were all attained by far, and BTI also produced outputs and outcomes in other areas, where no targets were

set. Bir Zeit CCE exceeded its single target to train at least 20 potential entrepreneurs, and in addition produced results on eight outputs and five outcomes. Bir Zeit CoE scored very well on the 11 outputs for which targets were set, because all were achieved. Their outcomes, however, lag behind quite considerably. Only one outcome was reached (percentage of SME started by vulnerable groups). BWF underperformed both in the achievement of outputs as well as outcomes. One output and one outcome target were met, the other targets were all not met. For six out of nine outputs, no results were achieved at all in 2012.

The Islamic University of Gaza (BTI/IUG) established cooperation with the Ministry of Education (MoE) in Gaza by involving the latter in being on the panel of the Business Plans competitions and Community outreach. In addition, the MoE expressed commitment of directly financing the graduates of the program by USD 10,000. The target groups also were colleagues and university graduates and not only students on the university campus.

Bir Zeit University mentioned in a report about their activities in 2011 to BiD that investors were eager to meet entrepreneurs and to review their business plan, but were disappointed by the level of presentation skills. Five out of seven entrepreneurs were unable to convey their message clearly to the investors. This issue was picked up in 2012, when pitching training sessions were setup together by BiD network and Bir Zeit, to help potential students to pitch their ideas to investors.

In Rwanda, results are reported for four partners in 2012. PSF met two out of the four output targets, but did produce outputs in other areas too. It is surprising to see that it has only been able to organise four roundtable sessions and multi-stakeholder dialogues (where five were targeted), but did manage to record a number of 2620 attendees of network sessions (where 20 were targeted). PSF has been weak in meeting its target related to formulating advocacy strategies. JCI has been particularly weak in delivering outcomes: none of the targets were met, despite the fact that the output targets were mostly met. The same applies to NUR, which has been very strong in delivering approved business plans, but did not record outcomes related to business start-ups. This could be related to the fact that NUR's beneficiaries are its students, who are less likely to start a business when still in college but also by the fact that no business development services could be provided. UP performed satisfactory on both outputs and outcomes. The combination of business development support (although limited) and the provision of Financial Packages (in the form of grants) is found to be successful. Besides a young entrepreneur club has been established.

The monitoring protocol results that were discussed above showed that in general, outputs are lagging behind, but outcomes are nevertheless scoring above target. The overviews of performance per partner in all countries can be found in Annex C.

4.3 Capacity building

The 5C baseline showed an average score of 2.47 on the scale of five for all countries and all criteria. This increased with 0.85 point to 3.32 in 2011. Looking at the five main criteria, the largest improvement has been made in Capability to deliver on development objectives, which increased by 1.06 point. Looking at the country level, differences can be observed between countries. OPT had the highest overall baseline score (2.95) and Liberia scored considerably lower with 2.08. In 2011, Burundi achieved the largest increase and also the highest total score with 3.63, followed by Kosovo (3.53). Liberia still scored lowest with 2.9 points. A decrease was measured for three individual criteria, namely Extent to which a strategic plan guides decisions, Level of operational credibility with stakeholders and Consistency between ambition, strategy, operations.

Based on the results it can be assumed that the capacity building activities by the Northern partners have contributed to increased capabilities for most criteria. Reason for concern is Liberia, where the baseline score was lowest, and insufficient increase has been reported.

The partners interviewed in the survey unanimously confirm that the EUC programme has strengthened their capacities in a very relevant manner, choosing qualifications such as “invaluable”, “totally in accordance with expectations”, “crucial” and “extremely important”. BBIN (Burundi) for instance indicate that a survey amongst past BBIN clients in various services showed that more than 75 percent of interviewed clients claim to have created jobs as a result of implementing the trainings of UEC. In OPT BWF reported that UECs role in developing their strategy, HR manual and operational manual rescued the organisation.

SPARK mentions in its annual report 2011 that “capacity building activities are showing qualitative results in the form of improved cooperation levels with the local partners in terms of reporting and their local management”. The narrative report of 2011 comments that in particular the MDF coaching days helped to develop capabilities of partners to monitor their projects. Nevertheless MDF itself is less positive. In their report over 2011 they indicate that improved capacity development is “a long way to go”, partly because individuals that attended their workshops are looking for other job opportunities.

The cooperation between SPARK/ Bid Network and the programme partners is based on short term (one year) projects and contracts. This short timeline very much limits the possibility to establish a more long term (capacity building) planning per partner based on their vision on what will need to be established in 2-3 years.

Institutional capacity

An assessment of the institutional capacity of the programme partners relates particularly to the 5C capabilities to deliver on development objectives and capacity to relate and attract. As shown above a good overall result was achieved on the criterion Capability to deliver on development objectives, which increased by 1.06 to 3.45 in 2011. Here, in particular Burundi accomplished a large growth of 1.63 points, reaching a total of 3.90 and becoming the best scoring country on this aspect. OPT had the highest baseline score (2.81), but ranked lowest in 2011, having achieved an increase of not more than 0.35. Within OPT, BWF had the lowest baseline score, 2.2. The best performing partner in OPT in the baseline was CCE, with 3.2 points. In Rwanda, NUR, JCI and PSF scored highest, with 2.8 points, and UP and YES both scores 2.4 points.

Adequacy of alliances maintained with stakeholders (sub-criterion of capacity to relate and attract) has an overall score of 3.32 in 2011. This was a slight increase of 0.59 compared to the baseline, which was already relatively high (2.72). The five countries all achieved a similar score in this area. Looking at the individual partners in Rwanda and OPT, high baseline scores are observed for BWF and JCI, with 4 points, and a low score for FPCCIA with 2 points. All other partners score 3 points on this criterion.

In Rwanda NUR, JCI and PSF received the highest scores for both capabilities. This assessment was confirmed in the interviews. The PSF is considered to be a strong well organised organisation but is also considered to be a governmental organisation. Also the NUR is considered to be a large, well organised institution but tends to be a very formal and inward looking organisation.

4.4 Lobby and advocacy

The third strategy of the UEC programme concerns the removal of barriers to doing business for the entrepreneurs and SMEs, with the aim to create an improved enabling environment for private sector development. Even though activities related to this have been undertaken, and outputs been achieved (round tables organised, advocacy strategies (re)formulated), no impacts have been measured yet for this strategy. SPARK indicated that this is related to the fact that it is difficult to attribute any improvement in the business environments to the activities undertaken in the programme.

The UEC itself is currently not involved in advocacy but supports its programme organisations in implementing such activities. Although the Rwandan country office plans to become involved in lobby and advocacy activities, but this could not be specified yet.

The UEC consider this to be a field where the local partner organisations should play an important role, but at the same time acknowledge that most of the partners are not capable to accomplish outcomes in this area. The local partners surveyed confirm that improvements can be made in the area of lobbying and advocacy. A partner in Burundi states that they are unaware of results of the UEC programme and its partners. Similar information was found in OPT, where respondents know advocacy is part of the programme, but none of them knows what activities exactly are undertaken, or if tangible successes have been attained. Some respondents claimed to be advocating with the local authorities but could not provide any example of any real specific issues they have advocated for.

Local partners surveyed indicated to be uncertain about their professionalism in lobbying. They therefore see a role for UEC in training the local partners in lobby and advocacy and familiarise them to utilise good practice in advocacy. SPARK has indicated that their approach for the remaining years will be to continue monitoring the lobby and advocacy activities, and possible include a new cooperation partner with specific experience in this field.

A partner in Kosovo indicates that the results are insufficient, and that it is difficult to lobby governments such theirs. It requires personal connections with decision makers at the government in order to accomplish changes, and this takes a very long time.

Unintended outcomes

SPARK observed that trained staff or potential entrepreneurs find employment in other, existing businesses after being trained through the UEC programme, rather than starting or expand their own business. Most partners do not consider this to be an issue. Some mention that their strict selection of training participants prevents such outcomes. BSC Monrovia indicate that employment is in fact a desired outcome of the UEC programme as well, and entrepreneurs who did not succeed in their competitions are recommended to enrol to their employability training course, and most of them find jobs in other companies or institutions. REJA acknowledge that some young people trained in entrepreneurship find employment as trainer in other institutions, notably NGOs, instead.

Influencing factors for performance

PO questioned during the country visits and in the survey acknowledge there are local circumstance that negatively affect development of the private sector in their country, and the effectiveness of the projects as well. Poor infrastructure (lack of electricity, poor internet access and literacy, poor road network in rural areas) is mentioned by several partners as a barrier.

Access to finance is known problem, and mentioned by partners from all countries as a factor that hinders SME development. SPARK has acknowledged this and initiated a loan guarantee fund to provide business start-ups with capital that could otherwise not be obtained through commercial banks. The fund is reported by SPARK to be functioning very well, with the exception of Rwanda where it has not yet been established, and OPT. In OPT entrepreneurs opt for the 'easy' money provided to them through subsidies from the many donors present in the country.

Political circumstance are another factor with a negative impact on the effectiveness of the UEC programme. North Kosovo is an area that is politically and economically unstable and insecure. Lack of law and police affect almost every segment of life. The triple governance of Serbia, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Kosovo forms a problem too. Kosovo governance and Kosovar institutions are not accepted by the population in North Kosovo. This affects businesses registration, entering the tax system and various legal procedures. The political circumstance (including corruption) are reported to be problematic towards achieving the programme results in Gaza and Burundi as well.

5 Findings efficiency

Efficiency of the programme and projects was assessed at three levels:

- efficiency of the programme and projects
- relation between inputs and outputs (i.e. were the results achieved good value for money)
- appropriateness of the programme design and set up (i.e. delivery mechanisms and systems)

Evaluation questions	Judgement Criteria/ Performance indicator
Were the outputs produced with the planned resources and delivered timely?	Extent to which projects are implemented in time Extent to which the budget is spent according to planning
What is the value for money of the input of partner organisations, in light of outputs and outcomes; e.g. the training provided, number of SMEs started etc.?	Relationship between inputs and outputs in terms of (maximisation of) outputs and outcomes defined for UEC activities
The adequacy of input of cooperation partners and alliance partners and delivery mechanism (incl. role country manager, project managers and BID website)?	Delivery mechanism and systems used and the extent to which they have helped (or hindered) the efficiency;

In addition we will briefly discuss additionality or the added value of UEC support. Would interventions have occurred without the support of UEC and if so in what shape.

5.1 Realisation of planning

With regard to planning (both time and budget) the programme and many of the projects are behind schedule. Table 5.1 below shows the budget absorption in percentages in 2011 and 2012 per country for SPARK, BiD Network, Cooperation partners and UEC as a whole in 2011 and 2012. Marked red are those where spending is low (below 75%). Marked green are those where considerable improvement has been made in 2012 compared to 2011.

Table 5.1 Budget absorption in 2011 and 2012

Partner	2011				2012			
	BiD	SPARK	CPs	UEC	BiD	SPARK	CPs	UEC
Burundi	90	69	36	72	82	84	60	81
Kosovo	94	82	28	79	104	77	31	79
Liberia	69	71	30	66	82	102	116	98
OPT	68	76	41	71	83	77	40	76
Rwanda	78	79	41	75	89	92	57	88
Total	79	76	35	73	88	85	61	84

UEC overall spending was only 73 percent in 2011, but increased to 84 percent in 2012. Under spending by BiD Network and SPARK was an issue in respectively Liberia, OPT and Burundi and OPT mainly, but improvement was made in 2012. Budget absorption by the cooperation partners is low (even below 50 percent in 2011) in all countries, although some improvement was made in 2012.

In OPT spending varies for the partners visited with about 75 percent by IUG, 90 percent by BZU Centre of Excellence and CCE and about 50 percent by BWF. Similar the project partners visited in Rwanda are behind schedule, with necessary projects extensions into 2012. The low absorption by BWF is partly explained by the pending approval of budget and partly because by the postponement of trainings for the beneficiaries. Finding local trainers proved to be difficult.

Reasons mentioned for delays in project implementation during the country visits are:

- Long time period necessary for start-up of UEC programme
- Overly optimistic projections at the start of new partnerships
- Project partners in OPT partners report a 3-4 month delay of transfer of the funds due to the signing of agreements in the beginning of the year leading to deferral of project implementation
- Limited availability contact person
- Absorption capacity project partners

Although the considerable delays suggest too much optimism on the part of both the project partners and the UEC at the start of the UEC programme, it can also be assumed that part of it is also an inherent part of project implementation, with unexpected issues arising, especially in the context of a fragile state. For instance in OPT the implementation of the programme in GAZA was hindered by the war. The fact that students at universities were targeted decreased the number of committed students who finished the courses. The UEC activity planning of 2013 states in this respect that problems caused by the occupation are still one of the main obstacles for consistent planning and smooth implementation of both partners and SMEs.

Cooperation partners

Findings show that implementation of the cooperation partners contracts has been particularly delayed. In the interviews with four of the cooperation partners explanations for the delays were usually found in the lack of clarity around the precise contribution of the partner. Other reasons identified are:

- Limited or no demand for supporting activities in some countries
- Programme partners did not initially see the value of coaching
- Ambitious planning of activities in the start of the programme
- Demands by local partners for DSA to attend workshops (Rwanda)
- Internal organisational issues cooperation partner

5.2 Cost-effectiveness

It is not always easy to compare costs of various projects, as they are highly dependent on context. The SPARK country offices do not have an official benchmarking system to assess value for money for each project but experiences from similar projects are used to make an assessment.

For instance in OPT the costs of SME trainings are high due to the high daily rate of business development experts which is not the case in other countries like Rwanda for example.

The cost to start one company for 2012 can be calculated as follows (calculated by dividing the total budget used by the number of new SMEs reported):

- Burundi 32,240
- Kosovo 32,247
- Liberia 132,471

- OPT 49,931
- Rwanda 20,890
- Average 36,309

The cost to create one job in a started SME for 2012 are calculated as follows (calculated similar as above):

- Burundi 7,009
- Kosovo 6,800
- Liberia 13,637
- OPT 16,080
- Rwanda 2.668
- Average 6,134

This shows that the costs to start one company or create one job in a started SME vary per country, and that Liberia and OPT perform worst in this respect. It is however too early to assess the value of these costs and differences. In many cases it takes time (years) for business to get started. A comparison of costs and outcomes at the end of the programme period will provide a clearer picture.

The project budgets do not always reflect all costs. The use of own facilities (at no costs) by programme partners in Rwanda and OPT are not always accounted for and in this sense provide efficiency gains.

5.3 The efficiency of programme design and management

The number of alliance partners and cooperation partners within the UEC is large, with in total six Northern cooperation partners. The programme proposal (section 5.2.6) states that alliance partners and cooperation partners are only involved in main activities within their field of expertise in order to increase efficiency.

Nevertheless the involvement of eight Northern partners all offering training and consultancy has led in several cases to overlap of activities and consequent inefficiencies as discussed in section 3.2. The planning and implementation of their respective programmes and activities is on purpose left to the cooperation partners to be based on their needs assessments of the partner organisations. Both cooperation partners and partner organisations commented that as a result training is not provided in a structured way; a clear overall training plan is lacking. It is felt by all parties that the cooperation partners have too much autonomy, do not concentrate sufficiently on the relevant partner organisations per cooperation partner only and are not looking for cooperation or synergies with other partners. In this respect the example of NABC was mentioned which organised a trade mission to Rwanda in 2012 without consulting the staff of SPARK or Bid Network present in the country. Similar, IntEnt indicated in their report 2012 that cooperation between the alliance partners and cooperation partners is almost non-existent, and that this has had an adverse effect on their activities.

All interviewed cooperation partners indicate to expect from SPARK stronger directions as to the context within which they can work, and how they can avoid doubling activities from other Northern partners. Worth mentioning is that partners think some improvements have already been made in this respect since the new SPARK programme manager was appointed in 2012. Also the recent developed online activity calendar was mentioned in this respect

The way the programme is managed by SPARK (and Bid Network) is another important aspect of efficiency. Programme partners very much appreciate the established SPARK country offices as the offices facilitate easy communication (both in terms of language and distance). The general perception however is that country offices have limited capacity (in cases both in quantitative and qualitative). It is felt that the country manager cannot dedicate sufficient time to the UEC programme. One of the respondents stated in this respect: *“often the communication with the country office is not regular enough. Country managers are often overloaded with work and they complain about that. Then there is less incentive for local partners to reach out to them. Other than that, they are very helpful.”* The high turnover of some of the SPARK offices, like has been the case in Rwanda en OPT also had negative effects on the relations with the partners.

In the keystone Development Partnerships Survey 2013 partners were critical about the complexity of SPARKs monitoring and reporting procedures. Also in the interviews during the field visits this was mentioned frequently and partners complained about the many ‘monitoring and reporting’ tools presented to them, such as the BSC, the required reporting format for the projects, the 5c questionnaire and assessment questionnaire from the SPARK country office. Monitoring and reporting procedures are likely to receive criticism from partner organisations, but overlap and inefficiencies should be avoided. The evaluation team has not been able to study the different tools in depth but it seems that efficiency gains can be made particularly when the BSC instrument is extended to include project information.

Respondents for keystone survey also provided low ratings for the independent monitoring by SPARK and to how information is fed back from beneficiaries. Similar remarks were made during the interviews in Rwanda.

The offered possibilities for flexible use of funds was reported by the partners as efficient. SPARK is flexible to demand driven needs of time and use of funds by partners. CCE (OPT) was enabled to use savings for new activities, IGU (OPT) use of facilities enabled them to invest more on the trainings.

5.4 Additionality

Many other donors are active in private sector development in the five programme countries in which the UEC programme acts. Donors sometimes compete for local partners but also for beneficiaries. The EUC activity plans 2013 states in this respect that another challenging aspect in the OPT is the coming and going of many donor programmes, that often come along with free incentives for SMEs. Also Rwanda is seen as a ‘donor darling’.

Many of the local partners are supported by other donor organisations as well with sometimes overlapping activities. The cooperation partners mentioned in this respect that some local partners did not need the training they offered, as they already had received sufficient similar training from other donors. In Rwanda, PSF is an example of a partner that receives substantial support from a few large donors. The support from UEC is considered small and currently not much effort is made to support the training activities offered although the value added of the UEC support (support to the district offices) is recognised.

In Rwanda relationships are much better with partners for whom UEC support is more essential such as UP and other educational institutions.

Other donors often work with grants, whereas UEC expects own contributions and only offers loans and matchmaking opportunities to entrepreneurs. As a result, local partners and beneficiaries (entrepreneurs, SMEs) tend to choose donors that offer the financially most attractive solution to them. The appeal of 'free' support from other programmes leads the partners away from UEC. One of the partners indicated that this is also due to the fact that the added value of UEC is not always clear to partners.

6 Findings sustainability

Sustainability relates to the likeliness that activities, outputs and outcomes will further continue in the future after completion of the UEC programme in 2015. To assess the sustainability of the programme, the following evaluation questions are discussed.

- What is the likelihood that the capacity of the programme partners has been strengthened sufficiently during the programme to allow them continue working with the beneficiaries without UEC support? This entails the extent to which the programme partners are developed organisationally, technically and financially.
- What is the likelihood that the programme outputs and outcomes will continue after completion of the programme? This entails the extent to which beneficiaries will continue to make use of project results.

6.1 Sustainability of local partners

As discussed in previous sections, most local partners consider the capacity of their organisation to have been built satisfactory by the programme. The positive developments in the scores on the 5C criteria suggest similar developments.

When the local partners in the survey were asked specifically if they foresee any financial or practical constraints to continue their activities after 2015, when the UEC programme ends, most partners indeed indicated to see constraints, albeit financially rather than organisationally. STIKK and Monrovia were the only partners indicating not to see any problems in this respect. Monrovia stated that they are developing different services that will generate revenues to them, and are development and that can support us financially. Other partners seem less advanced in this respect, but also indicate that other donors are needed in order for them to become financially sustainable. Also, the accessibility to the loan guarantee funds is mentioned as an important condition to continue their activities towards beneficiaries. Clearly, none of the partners consider themselves to be able to continue their activities without any support.

In OPT, all partners agree that the partner will sustain themselves after the programme ends in 2015, however, this would be due to the interest of other donors to step in and build on UEC's work.

The UEC programme is set up in such way, that local partners need to contribute increasingly (ten percent points more annually) to the funding of their activities under the programme. Financing does not need to be from own resources, but can also be from other donors. This way, UEC seeks to increase the donor diversity of activities in which their partners are involved, with the aim to make them less dependent of one donor, and increase the sustainability of their endeavours.

6.2 Sustainability of beneficiaries

The likelihood that the beneficiaries will continue to make use of the programme is partly linked to the capacities of the programme partner, as discussed in the previous section, and partly to their own capabilities and willingness to pay for the support from the local partner organisations. The need for more donor support expressed by the local partners would suggest that beneficiaries are not able or willing to pay for support themselves. However, this might also be a rather standard type

of approach from organisations that are used to receiving donor support and lack the necessity to find other, more sustainable sources of revenue.

When asked in the survey whether or not their beneficiaries are willing to pay for their support, responses by partner vary. Partners in Burundi all answer with 'yes' except Reja. In Kosovo, Zvecan and Strpce indicate beneficiaries are not yet ready to pay for their services, but BSK mention that they have already introduced fees to participants of their services. However, their experiences are not very positive, as people are used to receiving the same services for free, with donor money. STIKK indicate their members are already paying, and BSC Monrovia that their clients cannot afford to pay⁴.

In OPT, Bir Zeit stated that until now, students did not have to pay any fees for the training and coaching that they received. Next year they hope that participants will pay a fee to join the program and benefit from the trainings and services offered. BWF might charge the entrepreneurs fees for getting business plan training in order to contribute to BWF's sustainability.

⁴ This however relates to MFS II clients, according to Spark the BSC Monrovia also has some more advanced clients that do pay, or are willing to do so.

7 Conclusions and recommendations

In line with the Terms of Reference, the mid-term evaluation focused on the evaluation criteria relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. In this last chapter we will formulate conclusions based on these criteria. In addition, we present recommendations for the future.

7.1 Programme performance

Relevance

The UEC works in some of the most difficult countries, due to their post-conflict nature. Overall the programme addresses manifested needs of the target group. They are identified through extensive consultations in the field and by the own experience of the alliance partners SPARK and Bid Network. Furthermore the interventions are in-line with country and programme partners needs and priorities. The partner mix in most countries is supporting the full chain approach, with the exception of Kosovo, where only business support organisations have been selected. In OPT, the relevance of the selected partners is confirmed by the practice of the implementation, but in Rwanda partners needed to be replaced and added by SPARK. All project proposals cover elements of the UEC principles on support to women, youth and vulnerable groups. However in practice not all projects aim at the vulnerable, marginalised groups.

Effectiveness

During its first two years, the programme has achieved most output targets, and outcome targets were achieved, too. In general partner organisations and beneficiaries find that capacity building support has strengthened the functioning of their organisation. The scores on the 5C criteria have similarly improved from a baseline score of 2.47 (for all countries and all criteria) to 3.32 in 2011. The intended results of BiD networks activities (in particular website hits and online applications) are hampered by computer illiteracy and language barriers amongst the targets groups. These factors are mostly outside the influence of SPARK and BiD network.

The effectiveness of the second strategic line is dependent on the ability of UEC to select suitable local partners. In most countries the coalition has been successful in selecting suitable partners, except for Rwanda where some new partners were recently added. The approach for the other two strategic lines, capacity development and lobby and advocacy shows more weaknesses. Capacity building is provided by different cooperation partners and lacks a comprehensive (more long term) approach to guide these activities. The effectiveness of advocacy activities of local partners are unclear, although activities related to this have been undertaken, and output targets have been achieved. A baseline for these activities was done but the partner organisation were left free to plan their L&A activities and at present a strategic focus at country level seems to be missing in this respect.

Efficiency

With regard to planning (both time and budget) the programme is behind schedule. Under spending by BiD Network and SPARK was an issue in respectively Liberia, OPT and Burundi and OPT mainly, but improvement was made in 2012. Although the delays suggest too much optimism on the part of both the project partners and the UEC at the start of the programme, it can also be assumed that part of it is an inherent part of project implementation, with unexpected issues arising, especially in the context of a fragile state. Particularly the implementation of the cooperation partners contracts has been delayed. In the interviews with four of the cooperation partners

explanations for the delays were usually found in the lack of clarity around the precise contribution of the partner. Partners were critical about the complexity of SPARKs monitoring and reporting procedures, specifically the many 'monitoring and reporting' tools presented to them were mentioned. Programme partners very much appreciate the established SPARK country offices which allows for frequent interaction with partners organisations, but the general perception is that country offices have limited capacity.

The presence of many donors, in particular in Rwanda and OPT, has an effect on the additionality of the UEC programme in these countries. The (perceived) value added that the UEC programme brings to the specific partners or projects it supports, differs. For some partner the support provided by UEC to the specific projects is essential as they have little other support available. In other cases donors almost seem to compete for the partner organisations as the POs are approached by other donors to implement similar activities.

Sustainability

Most local partners foresee financial constraints in the continuation of their activities after the end of the UEC programme. The involvement of other donors is predominantly mentioned as a means to strengthen the financial sustainability of the partners. Most partners do not think that their beneficiaries will be able or willing to pay themselves for the services provided to them. This is partly linked to the presence of other donors who provide similar services free of charge.

7.2 Organisational design

The MFS II programme was the start of cooperation for the UEC and the collaboration with the six cooperation partners. On paper the collaboration between the different partners looks complementary and valuable in providing full support to the local partners. Whereby due to MFS regulations the specific contributions of the sub-contractors had to be fixed from the start the programme.

The complementarities of the alliance partners SPARK and BiD Network has materialised in the implementation of the programme, but both partners showed some reservation as to the successfulness of their collaboration. Their approaches differ such, that acting as one managing, steering and stimulating body to the partners has not been able.

The active cooperation partners all have a training profile (except for NABC), but focus on different type of beneficiaries. Still, in practice an overlap of training provision has been observed and some of the agreements needed to be adapted. The partner organisations operate independently to fulfil their contract.

In practice, the offer to the programme partners is very valuable but a comprehensive approach is lacking. Experiences are that different (sometimes overlapping) training and coaching activities are offered to the programme partners by the cooperation partners (particularly MDF and Triodos) but also by Bid Network and in some cases SPARK. A structural planning of all these activities is however missing. Besides, the one year projects and consequent short term vision of partner organisation limit the scope of the organisational development activities. In addition, some of the cooperation partners are critical about the ability of the local partners to make full use of the opportunities offered.

7.3 Recommendations

- A stronger role for SPARK country offices would benefit the support to and partnerships with local partner organisations, as well as cooperation partners. This would require an increased capacity of the country offices, as they are now considered by partners to be under staffed.
- A consequent improvement of independent monitoring and feedback to partner organisations, assisting partners in the, in their view, complexity of SPARK's monitoring and reporting procedures.
- A stronger role for SPARK (head office as well as country offices) in the coordination of the efforts of the different cooperation partners with due attention to the timing of the different capacity programmes. An increase in effectiveness and efficiency can be gained when more cooperation between northern partners is sought. This avoids doubling of training offer towards southern partners and stimulates an effective use of resources by partners.
- The development of comprehensive capacity building plan for the partner organisations. Optimally the plans will play a significant role in determining the scope, design, coherence and ultimate outcomes of the different capacity building engagement. Key elements should also involve individual and organisational commitments.
- Improvement of training and support for the implementation of lobby and advocacy activities within the programme. In combination, the formulation of a more strategic focus for advocacy at country level, considering the involvement of SPARK country offices in advocacy, and teaming up with other donor organisations.
- Better linking of programmes pro-poor/ vulnerable groups focus with the different activities including advocacy.
- Safeguard the implementation of UECs full chain approach, which is expressed through a local partner mix existing of universities in combination with business support organisations. This entails also the establishment of a stronger link between the business plan competitions and subsequent business services support.
- Expanding the horizon of the project-contracts between SPARK and partner organisations from one year to a multiyear planning, in order to better meets partners' long-term vision on capacity building.
- Make BSC the core monitoring tool and explore possibilities to reduce the number of monitoring reports required from partners by combining monitoring tools where possible such as for instance the assessments tools used by MDF and SPARK.
- Providing more support to partners in the identification of sustainable revenue models, to increase their financial sustainability. Both MDF and Triodus/Facet could play a role in this.
- Exploring possibilities to introduce the loan guarantee fund in Rwanda, especially towards reaching more young entrepreneurs since the accessibility of the present government fund for youth and women appears to be limited for youth.
- Critically asses additionality of support and activities particularly for partner organisations in Rwanda and OPT. The presence of other donors who could take over the activities of Spark or the limited 'appreciation' of the support by the partner organisation could provide a reason to stop support and concentrate on other partners or even countries.

Annex A – List of interviews

Name	Position	Organisation	Country
Mr Nic van der Jagt	M&E Manager	SPARK Head office	Netherlands
Mr Marc de Klerk	Programme Manager,	SPARK Head office	Netherlands
Ms Annemarie van Mossel	Programme Manager,	BiD network Head office	Netherlands
Ms Sanne Boogers	Coordinator	BiD network Head office	Netherlands
Mr Huub Mudde	Project consultant	Maastricht School of Management	Netherlands
Ms Esther Wintraecken	Trainer/ consultant	MDF	Netherlands
Mr Dieter Kohn	Trainer/ consultant	Triodos Facet	Netherlands
Mr Peter Coelewij	Trainer/ consultant	IntEnt	Netherlands
Ms. Maia GEDDE	Project Manager	SPARK Rwanda	Rwanda
Mr. Gilbert RWIGEMA	Program Officer	SPARK Rwanda	Rwanda
Ms. Rika FONTANA	Advisor East Africa	BiD NETWORK	Rwanda
Mr. Donatien MUNGWARAREBA	Program Officer	Private Sector Federation (PSF)	Rwanda
Mr. Laurent ULIMUBENSHI	Managing Director	Youth Agribusiness Company Ltd	Rwanda
Mr. Isidore NIZEYIMANA	Managing Director	TEKUTANGIJE	Rwanda
Mr. Albert NZAMUKWEREKA	Outgoing president	Junior Chamber International (JCI)	Rwanda
Ms. Lydie HAKIZIMANA	Outgoing President , from 2 years ago.	Junior Chamber International (JCI)	Rwanda
Mr. Livingstone NKUUSI	SME Development Senior Officer	Rwanda Development Board (RDB)	Rwanda
Ms. Ingabire FRANCOISE	Managing Director	Tropical Services Limited	Rwanda
Mr. Moses TUMUSIME	Project Coordinator	Umutara Polytechnic (UP) SPARK Project	Rwanda
Ms. Brandine KABATESI	General Manager	GSM Ltd	Rwanda
Focus Group	Representatives of:	Rwanda Tourism University College (RTUC), National University of Rwanda (NUR) and Umutara Polytechnic (UP)	Rwanda
Eng. Mohammad Iskeak	Incubator Director	Islamic University of Gaza	OPT
Eng. Rafat AbuShaban	SME Development Specialist	Islamic University of Gaza	OPT
Ms. Amal Abushammallah	Project Coordinator	Islamic University of Gaza	OPT
Wael Oudah	Financial Manager	Islamic University of Gaza	OPT
Khaled Kalhoot	Center of Continuous	Islamic University of	OPT

Name	Position	Organisation	Country
	Education Director	Gaza	
Ismael Kordyah and Omaymah Moghanny	Ministry of Education in Gaza.	Islamic University of Gaza	OPT
Focus Group of 17 beneficiaries		Islamic University of Gaza	OPT
Doaa Wadi	Director	BWF	OPT
Joumana Salous	Project Coordinator	BWF	OPT
Aya Mlaitat	Beneficiary	BWF	OPT
Ms Olga Batrawi	CCE Director and Project Manager	CCE	OPT
Waleed Jarashah	Beneficiary	CCE	OPT
Ibrahim Aboqteash	Director	Zenni Center BZU	OPT
Younes Hammoudah	Project Manager and Trainer	Zenni Center BZU	OPT
Ali Bader	Beneficiary	Zenni Center BZU	OPT
Mohammad Darmousa	Beneficiary	Zenni Center BZU	OPT
Mr. Ali Mohanna	Liaison Person with SPARK.	Union of Chambers of Commerce	OPT
Fawz Abuhijlah	Ex. Program Coordinator	SPARK office	OPT
Ziad Ghannam	Financial Officer	SPARK office	OPT
Nic VanderJagt	M& E Manager	SPARK office	OPT
Anwar Jayyousi	Managing Director	FATEN	OPT
Hind Jarrar	Head of Fundraising	FATEN	OPT

Annex B – Evaluation matrix

Evaluation Criteria	Evaluation Question	Suggested Judgement Criteria/ Performance indicator	Sources of verification
Relevance	What is the relevance of the programme and its activities in view of the programme partners and country priorities and needs	The portfolio of activities clearly fit the needs of the partners and organisational requirements and countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review, interviews/ survey with programme partners and field visits
	What is the relevance of activities in view of the beneficiaries needs? And conflict-sensitivity?	The portfolio of activities and individual activities clearly fit the needs of the intended beneficiaries (vulnerable and marginalised groups)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review, interviews with programme partners and beneficiaries
	What is the relevance of the approach of the alliance partners and cooperation partners (including delivery mechanisms) in light of the overall programme objective	The range of interventions and delivery mechanisms used and the extent to which they have helped (or hindered) the relevance of the programme activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review, interviews with Staff SPARK and BID Network, cooperation partners and programme partners and field visits
	What is the relevance of the programme partners selected?	The partners selected and the extent to which this has helped to achieve synergy and cooperation ⁵ .	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review, interviews/ survey with programme partners
Effectiveness	To which extent has the programme been attaining its outputs and outcomes as identified in the Programme Proposal and Monitoring Protocol?	Evidence that outputs (targets) and outcome (targets) both in terms of quantity and quality have been achieved (or are likely to be).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review of monitoring reports, project files and interviews
	To which extent has the programme realised any unintended results	Indications of (potential) unplanned positive or negative effects of the programme, including informal employability.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review, interviews and field visits
	Whether and how the activities undertaken by the alliance partners, cooperation partners and programme partners and outputs achieved have been/are likely to be effective with respect to the expected outcomes and objectives	Concrete activities and outputs can be determined that have contributed/ are likely to contribute to the realisation of outcomes and objectives such as an improved business climate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review and field visits, interviews with alliance partners and cooperation partners, survey

⁵This strongly links to issues of effectiveness

Evaluation Criteria	Evaluation Question	Suggested Judgement Criteria/ Performance indicator	Sources of verification
Efficiency	Were the outputs produced with the planned resources and delivered timely?	Extent to which projects are implemented in time Extent to which the budget is spent according to planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring and annual reports
	What is the value for money of the input of programme partners , in light of outputs and outcomes ; e.g. the training provided, , number of SMEs started etc.?	Relationship between inputs and outputs in terms of (maximisation of) outputs and outcomes defined for UEC activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review, activity analysis
	The adequacy of input of cooperation partners and alliance partners and delivery mechanism (incl. role country manager, project managers and BID website)?	Delivery mechanism and systems used and the extent to which they have helped (or hindered) the efficiency;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews in the Netherlands and during field visits, survey
Sustainability	What is the likelihood that programme outputs and outcomes will continue after completion of the programme in 2015?	-Organisational sustainability: achievements are anchored at the organisational level -Likelihood that beneficiaries will continue of make use of the project results -Financial sustainability, political and institutional sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Field visits
	What is the likelihood that the capacity of programme partners has been strengthened sufficiently during the course of the programme to allow them to continue working with the beneficiaries without EUC support?	Extent to which the programme partners are properly developed / (technically, financially and managerially) for continuing to deliver the project's benefits/services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Field visits

Annex C - Monitoring protocol results 2012

Results per country in 2012

Output	Burundi			Kosovo			Liberia			OPT			Rwanda		
	PPF	MP	target	PPF	MP	target	PPF	MP	target	PPF	MP	target	PPF	MP	target
1. # of (potential) entrepreneurs trained / awarded certificate	220	211	450	845	335	600	105	145	450	780	710	600	1041	758	900
2. of (potential) entrepreneurs from vulnerable groups trained / awarded certificate	102	30	342	696	66	456	58	0	342	648	440	456	489	0	684
3. % of (potential) entrepreneurs from vulnerable groups trained / awarded certificate	46%	200%	76%	82%	241%	76%	55%	98%	76%	83%	170%	76%	47%	40%	76%
4. # of approved business plan applications	89	26	150	192	115	200	56	15	150	242	95	200	489	180	300
5. # of approved business plan applications from vulnerable groups	0	15	114	166	0	152	19	0	114	211	43	152	336	0	228
6. % of approved business plan applications from vulnerable groups		100%	76%	86%	125%	76%	34%	45%	76%	87%	1070%	76%	69%	40%	76%
7. # of attendees of network sessions	413	150	150	225	242	200	76	255	150	725	300	200	3282	20	300
8. # of attendees of network sessions from vulnerable groups	9	150		32	0	152	35	0		503	288	152	1728	0	
9. # of successful matchmaking introductions	0	0	17	132	31	23	5	5	17	15	7	23	10	0	35
10. # of successful matchmaking introductions for vulnerable groups	0	0	13	132	0	17	4	0	13	14	3	17	7	0	26
11. # of website hits	855	0	7500	4331	5300	10000	2366	174	7500	3718	339,67	10000	6515	500	15000
12. # of roundtable sessions and multi-stakeholder dialogues held	2	2	0	59	17	0	21	2	0	18	0	0	8	22	0
13. # of advocacy strategies (re)formulated	0	4	0	6	4	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	2	11	0
Outcome															
14. # of indirect jobs created	151	100	0	173,8	25	0	100	50	0	177	0	0	554	500	0
15. # of jobs created in started SMEs	92	15	23	147	104	31	68	25	23	59	47	31	368	500	47
16. # of jobs created in started SMEs taken by vulnerable groups	0	3		129	15		0	15		56	29		60	0	
17. # of SMEs started	20	13	3	31	55	4	7	20	3	19	33	4	47	50	6
18. # of SMEs started by vulnerable groups	16	0		29	7	3	7	0		18	22	3	13	0	
19. % of SMEs started by vulnerable groups	80%	100%	0%	94%	125%	75%	100%	40%	0%	95%	170%	75%	28%	30%	0%
20. # of SMEs grown	1	26	3	35	37	4	7	20	3	14	20	4	52	0	6
21. # of SMEs grown among vulnerable groups	0	0		34	0		7	0		13	7		44	0	
22. % of new SMEs that survive first 3 years	0%	250%	0%	0%	820%	0%	0%	80%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	80%	0%
23. % decrease in business barrier index	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%		0%
24. Level of engagement of policy makers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0

PPF = Partner Proposal Form; MP = Monitoring Protocol

Burundi

Output	Total		COPEd		AFAB		REJA		CUFORE		BBIN	
	Result	Target	Result	Targets	Result	Targets	Result	Targets	Result	Targets	Result	Targets
1. # of (potential) entrepreneurs trained / awarded certificate	220	211	87	64	0	72	85	30	0	45	48	
2. # of (potential) entrepreneurs from vulnerable groups trained / awarded certificate	102	30	17		0		85	30	0		0	
3. % of (potential) entrepreneurs from vulnerable groups trained / awarded certificate	46%	2	19,54%			100,00%	100,00%	100,00%			0	
4. # of approved business plan applications	89	26	0	6	0		0	15	0	5	89	
5. # of approved business plan applications from vulnerable groups	0	15	0		0		0	15	0		0	
6. % of approved business plan applications from vulnerable groups	0	1	0,00%		0,00%		0,00%	100,00%	0,00%		0	
7. # of attendees of network sessions	413	150	0		2	150	0		7		404	
8. # of attendees of network sessions from vulnerable groups	9	150	0		2	150	0		7		0	
9. # of successful matchmaking introductions	0	0	0		0		0		0		0	
10. # of successful matchmaking introductions for vulnerable groups	0	0	0		0		0		0		0	
11. # of website hits	855	0	0		0		0		0		855	
12. # of roundtable sessions and multi-stakeholder dialogues held	2	2	0		0	1	0		0	1	2	
13. # of advocacy strategies (re)formulated	0	4	0		0	2	0	1	0	1		
Outcomes												0
14. # of indirect jobs created	151	100	0		0		0		0	100	151	
15. # of jobs created in started SMEs	92	15	0		0		34		0	15	58	
16. # of jobs created in started SMEs taken by vulnerable groups	0	3								3	0	
17. # of SMEs started	20	13	0	6	0		16	2	0	5	4	
18. # of SMEs started by vulnerable groups	16	0	0		0		16		0		0	
19. % of SMEs started by vulnerable groups	100%	1	0		0		1	100%	0		0	
20. # of SMEs grown	1	26	0	6	0		0	20	0		1	
21. # of SMEs grown among vulnerable groups	0	0										
22. % of new SMEs that survive first 3 years	0	2,5	0	2	0		0		0	50%	0	
23. % decrease in business barrier index		0									0	
24. Level of engagement of policy makers		0									0	

Kosovo

MIS Output and outcome indicators	Total	Bsck	STIKK	BC Zvecan	CTD/UM	FRACTAL	BCS Strpce
Output							
1. # of (potential) entrepreneurs trained / awarded certificate	318	56	0	91	41	75	55
2. # of (potential) entrepreneurs from vulnerable groups trained / awarded certificate	318	56	0	91	41	75	55
3. % of (potential) entrepreneurs from vulnerable groups trained / awarded certificate	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%
4. # of approved business plan applications	82	8	0	23	7	20	24
5. # of approved business plan applications from vulnerable groups	82	8	0	23	7	20	24
6. % of approved business plan applications from vulnerable groups	100,00%	100,00%		100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%
7. # of attendees of network sessions	32	0	0	0	0	32	0
8. # of attendees of network sessions from vulnerable groups	32	0	0	0	0	32	0
9. # of successful matchmaking introductions	108	0	0	18	0	0	90
10. # of successful matchmaking introductions for vulnerable groups	108	0	0	18	0	0	90
11. # of website hits	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12. # of roundtable sessions and multi-stakeholder dialogues held	51	0	0	3	0	4	44
13. # of advocacy strategies (re)formulated	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Outcomes							
14. # of indirect jobs created	125	0	0	9	8	2	106
15. # of jobs created in started SMEs	103	49	0	9	0	0	45
16. # of jobs created in started SMEs taken by vulnerable groups	103	49		9			45
17. # of SMEs started	25	10	0	2	0	0	13
18. # of SMEs started by vulnerable groups	25	10	0	2	0	0	13
19. % of SMEs started by vulnerable groups	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	100,00%
20. # of SMEs grown	20	0	0	6	0	0	14
21. # of SMEs grown among vulnerable groups	20	0	0	6	0	0	14
22. % of new SMEs that survive first 3 years	0						0
23. % decrease in business barrier index	0	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
24. Level of engagement of policy makers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Liberia

MIS Output and outcome indicators				
Output		BSC Monrovia	ALU	LBBF
1. # of (potential) entrepreneurs trained / awarded certificate	0			
2. # of (potential) entrepreneurs from vulnerable groups trained / awarded certificate	0			
3. % of (potential) entrepreneurs from vulnerable groups trained / awarded certificate	0%			
4. # of approved business plan applications	0			
5. # of approved business plan applications from vulnerable groups	0			
6. % of approved business plan applications from vulnerable groups	0,00%			
7. # of attendees of network sessions	15	15		
8. # of attendees of network sessions from vulnerable groups	12	12		
9. # of successful matchmaking introductions	0	0		
10. # of successful matchmaking introductions for vulnerable groups	0			
11. # of website hits	221	221		
12. # of roundtable sessions and multi-stakeholder dialogues held	4	4		
13. # of advocacy strategies (re)formulated	0			
Outcome				
14. # of indirect jobs created	50	50		
15. # of jobs created in started SMEs	34	34		
16. # of jobs created in started SMEs taken by vulnerable groups	0	0		
17. # of SMEs started	4	4		
18. # of SMEs started by vulnerable groups	4	4		
19. % of SMEs started by vulnerable groups	100,00%	100,00%		
20. # of SMEs grown	4	4		
21. # of SMEs grown among vulnerable groups	4	4		
22. % of new SMEs that survive first 3 years	0,00%			
23. % decrease in business barrier index	0			
24. Level of engagement of policy makers	0			

OPT

MIS Output and outcome indicators	BTI Gaza		CCE		CoE		BWF	
	Realised	Targets	Realised	Targets	Realised	Targets	Realised	Targets
Output								
1. # of (potential) entrepreneurs trained / awarded certificate	163	100	76	20	424	500	15	90
2. # of (potential) entrepreneurs from vulnerable groups trained / a	163		46		424	350	15	90
3. % of (potential) entrepreneurs from vulnerable groups trained /	100%		61%		100%	70%	1	100%
4. # of approved business plan applications	62	40	26		134	40	0	15
5. # of approved business plan applications from vulnerable groups	62		15		134	28	0	15
6. % of approved business plan applications from vulnerable groups	100%		58%		100%	70%	0	1000%
7. # of attendees of network sessions	58		43		414	120	0	180
8. # of attendees of network sessions from vulnerable groups	58		31		414	108	0	180
9. # of successful matchmaking introductions	10	3	0		5	4	0	0
10. # of successful matchmaking introductions for vulnerable group	10		0		4	3,00	0	0
11. # of website hits	1834		0		1165	100	0	239,667
12. # of roundtable sessions and multi-stakeholder dialogues held	9		4		2		3	0
13. # of advocacy strategies (re)formulated	2	1	0		0		0	0
Outcome								
14. # of indirect jobs created	20		100		6		51	
15. # of jobs created in started SMEs	32	12	6		7	20	14	15
16. # of jobs created in started SMEs taken by vulnerable groups	30		6		7	14	13	15
17. # of SMEs started	13	8	1		2	10	3	15
18. # of SMEs started by vulnerable groups	13		0		2	7	3	15
19. % of SMEs started by vulnerable groups	100%		0%		100%	70%	1	100%
20. # of SMEs grown	7		1	10	1	10	5	0
21. # of SMEs grown among vulnerable groups	7		0		1	7	5	0
22. % of new SMEs that survive first 3 years					0	1	0	0
23. % decrease in business barrier index								
24. Level of engagement of policy makers								

Rwanda

MIS Output and outcome indicators	PSF		JCI		NUR		UP	
	realised	target	realised	target	realised	target	realised	target
1. # of (potential) entrepreneurs trained / awarded certificate	190	158	90	300	12	200	313	100
2. # of (potential) entrepreneurs from vulnerable groups trained / awarded certificate	114		79		11		285	
3. % of (potential) entrepreneurs from vulnerable groups trained / awarded certificate	60%		88%	40%	92%		91%	
4. # of approved business plan applications	115		75	50	75	30	174	100
5. # of approved business plan applications from vulnerable groups	85		45		50		156	
6. % of approved business plan applications from vulnerable groups	74%		60%	40%	67%		90%	
7. # of attendees of network sessions	2620	20	0		235		50	
8. # of attendees of network sessions from vulnerable groups	1620		0		108		0	
9. # of successful matchmaking introductions	10		0		0		0	
10. # of successful matchmaking introductions for vulnerable groups	5		0		0		2	
11. # of website hits	175		2650	500	0		125	
12. # of roundtable sessions and multi-stakeholder dialogues held	4	5	4	10	0	5	0	2
13. # of advocacy strategies (re)formulated	1	3	1	3	0	3	0	2
Outcome								
14. # of indirect jobs created	300		9	500	20		160	
15. # of jobs created in started SMEs	251	300	7	200	7		78	
16. # of jobs created in started SMEs taken by vulnerable groups	0		0		0		60	
17. # of SMEs started	5		7	30	7	20	26	
18. # of SMEs started by vulnerable groups	2		2		2		7	
19. % of SMEs started by vulnerable groups	40%		29%	30%	29%		27%	
10. # of SMEs grown	35		7		0		9	
21. # of SMEs grown among vulnerable groups	35		0		0		9	
22. % of new SMEs that survive first 3 years	0		0	30%	0	50%	0	
23. % decrease in business barrier index								
24. Level of engagement of policy makers								



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